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Reply

"New Governance" in Legal Thought and
in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote
to Overzealous Lumping
Bradley C. Karkkainent
Orly Lobel's provocative article The Renew Deal: The Fall
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought' is an ambitious and path-breaking canvass of recent academic literature on what may be termed the "New
Governance." 2 The article usefully identifies, discusses, and
links many of the leading strands in this scholarship, gleaned
from a disparate array of specialized fields of inquiry within the
t Professor and 2004 Julius E. Davis Chair, University of Minnesota
Law School. The author is also an investigator with the Project on Public Problem-Solving (POPPS), a collaborative, interdisciplinary research effort by
scholars investigating New Governance approaches across a variety of policy
domains. Other principals in the POPPS group, including Mike Dorf, Archon
Fung, Jim Liebman, Dara O'Rourke, Chuck Sabel, and Bill Simon, are cited
extensively in Orly Lobels article. Individually or collectively, members of the
POPPS group also collaborate with many other scholars cited in Lobel's article, including, inter alios, Grdinne de Bfirca, Dan Farber, Dan Fiorino, Jody
Freeman, Oliver Gerstenberg, Neil Gunningham, DeWitt John, Martha Minow, Eric Orts, Joe Rees, Joel Rogers, Joanne Scott, Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Susan Sturm, Craig Thomas, David Trubek, Louise Trubek, Roberto Unger,
Annecoos Wiersema, Erik Olin Wright, and Jonathan Zeitlin.
1. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
2. I borrow the term "New Governance" directly from the title of a recent
conference entitled "New Governance and Constitutionalism in Europe and
the U.S.," held at the University of Cambridge (U.K.), July 19-20, 2004, addressing many of the themes identified in Lobel's article. Previous uses of the
term in academic literature include R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance:
Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUD. 652 (1996); Lester M. Salamon,
The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001); David M. Trubek & James S. Mosher, New
Governance, Employment Policy, and the European Social Model, in
GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY 33 (Jonathan Zeitlin &
David M. Trubek eds., 2003); Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and
New Governance:Advocating for Healthcare, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575.
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American legal academy and in the policy sciences more generally. Lobel's article also attempts to synthesize the diverse elements of this scholarship into a coherent, unifying whole. For
reasons outlined below, I believe the article only partially succeeds in its synthetic ambition. It relies at times on overly
broad generalizations that gloss over important differences, debates, and divergent tendencies within the field. Despite these
limitations, however, The Renew Deal must be counted an important and arresting contribution to the scholarly literature,
marking a promising debut to Lobel's career as a legal scholar.
At the risk of pedantry, let me begin with some terminological quibbles. Lobel announces the emergence of a "governance model" 3 and a "new paradigm of governance." 4 Elsewhere
she coins her own neologism, "Renew Deal," 5 apparently to signal her belief that this development is as far-reaching in its
consequences as was the original New Deal, and that it exhibits
both elements of continuity and yet significant departures from
its forebear.
In place of Lobel's terms "governance model" and "Renew
Deal," I shall substitute "New Governance,". "New Governance
model," "New Governance scholarship," and so on. I adopt the
language of "New Governance" in part because that phrase has
already established something of a following on both sides of
the Atlantic. "New Governance" refers to a broad family of innovative modes of public governance, some occurring within the
European Union, some within the United States, and some
elsewhere. 6 Similarly, the term "New Governance scholarship"
has acquired a recognized meaning, referring to scholarship on
these innovative modes of public governance. Consequently, the
term "New Governance" has a somewhat more definite connotation than the more generic "governance," which promiscuously embraces multiple usages, including, inter alia, the institutions of government itself, "corporate governance," "global
governance," and "good governance," in addition to "New Gov7
ernance."

3. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 1, at 344 (describing "a paradigm shift from
a regulatory to a governance model").
4. See, e.g., id. ("[C]ontemporary legal thought and practice are pointing
to the emergence of a new paradigm-governance... ").
5. See, e.g., id. at 343 (describing a "shift... to a 'Renew Deal' governance paradigm").
6. See supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
7. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 2, at 652 (stating that the term "govern-
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At the same time, however, "New Governance" remains a
relatively bland and imprecise descriptor of this family of governance innovations, and thus is capable of neutrally encompassing the multiple distinct flavors of scholarship that jointly
comprise the broad category to which both Lobel and I refer.
Finally, transatlantic adoption of the term "New Governance"
signals that neither the scholarship nor the underlying social
phenomenon is understood to be a uniquely American development. This is a point possibly obscured by Lobel's use of the
term "Renew Deal" and her repeated efforts to situate "New
Governance" as successor to what she calls the "New Deal regulatory model,"8 suggesting a largely U.S.-centric orientation.
None of these linguistic quibbles bears on the substance of
Lobel's argument, of course. At bottom, Lobel's thesis is simply
that a distinctive new brand of legal and policy scholarshipcall it "New Governance scholarship"-has emerged in recent
years. This scholarship endeavors simultaneously to chronicle,
interpret, analyze, theorize, and advocate a seismic reorientation in both the public policymaking process and the tools employed in policy implementation. The valence of this reorientation, New Governance scholars argue, is generally away from
the familiar model of command-style, fixed-rule regulation by
administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative,
multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving New Governance.
As Lobel rightly points out, the older, command-style regulatory model grew to dominance in the United States in the
New Deal era, 9 but arguably it found its fullest expression a bit
ance" embraces at least six different meanings); see also Adrienne H6ritier,
New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making Without Legislating?, in
COMMON GOODS: REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

185, 185 (Adrienne H6ritier ed., 2002) (noting ambiguity in the term "governance," which when used broadly "implies every mode of political steering involving public and private actors, including the traditional modes of government," but when used more narrowly "comprises types of political steering in
which nonhierarchical modes of guidance, such as persuasion and negotiation,
are employed, and/or public and private actors are engaged in policy formulation").
8. See, e.g., Lobel supra note 1, at 343-45, 351-55.
9. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440-41 (2003) (stating that "[t]he New Deal Congress created a raft of new federal regulatory agencies and endowed them with
very broad powers," and defenders of the New Deal advanced a theory of
"regulatory management by experts" who would be "[g]uided by experience
and professional discipline").
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later, in the Great Society of the 1960s and the consumer protection and "environmental decade" of the 1970s. 10 Unquestionably, it also has rough counterparts in other legal and political cultures in Europe and elsewhere. The old regulatory
model was hierarchical, state-centric, bureaucratic, top-down
and expert-driven. The old model attempted to microengineer
solutions to societal problems through a series of fragmentary,
piecemeal, and highly prescriptive regulatory interventions,"1
and it tended to produce an impossibly complex and tangled
web of rigid, uniform one-size-fits-all rules that in truth did not
quite fit anyone.12
In contrast, the New Governance model (at least according
to its proponents) breaks with fixity, state-centrism, hierarchy,
excessive reliance on bureaucratic expertise, and intrusive prescription. It aspires instead to be more open-textured, participatory, bottom-up, consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible, integrative, and pragmatic. On some variants, it also aspires to
be adaptive, claiming both the capacity and the necessity to
continuously generate new learning and to adjust in response
to new information and changing conditions, systematically
employing information feedback loops, benchmarking, rolling
standards of best practice, and principles of continuous improvement. 13 New Governance scholars claim to have discerned
10. See id. at 441-42 (stating that administrative law changed dramatically in the late 1960s in response to criticisms of agency "capture[]," "[t]he
rise of public interest law," and "[a] new wave of environmental, health, safety,
civil rights, and other social regulatory programs adopted by Congress as part
of a 'rights revolution"'). The Environmental Protection Agency and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration were established in 1970, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission in 1972, and the Occupational Safety

and Health Administration in 1973. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES
26-28, 29 tbl.1-1 (5th ed. 2002).

11. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 27-38 (2001) (detailing the "shortcomings of the
current U.S. environmental regulatory system," which include "fragmentation,
rigidity, complexity, and high compliance and administrative costs," because
the existing system "requires the development and adoption of a myriad of
highly specific requirements to control the conduct of those subject to regulation").
12. See id. at 31-32 (stating that the information costs associated with
conventional environmental regulation "lead regulators to adopt uniform
measures for all sources within a given industry or other category," with the
result that "requirements are not tailored to the significant variations among
plants and industries").
13. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287-88 (1998) (advocating a
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the emergence of at least a nascent form of this New Governance model in disparate areas of public policy. In the United
States, New Governance scholars have written on developments in, inter alia, environmental protection, 14 public school
17
16
reform, 15 "problem-solving courts," health care reform,
18
equal protection generworkplace gender discrimination,
20 community policing, 2 1 community eco19
ally, labor rights,
nomic development, 22 and public law litigation. 23 In the European context, discussions of New Governance tend to focus on
the European Union's Open Method of Coordination and other
"soft law" approaches to policy development and coordination
on a European Union-wide basis, 24 although the emergence of
"public sector model of problem solving" based upon 'linked systems of local
and inter-local or federal pooling of information, each applying in its sphere
the principles of benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error correction, so that actors scrutinize their initial understandings of problems and feasible solutions" and 'learn from one another's successes and failures").
14. See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation:
Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1999);

Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U.
L. REV. 1227 (1995); Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism,
in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers
eds., 2000).
15. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts:
From Innovation to Institutionalization,40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare Governance in Transition,29 AM. J.L. & MED. 395 (2003).
18. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
19. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist
Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261 (2004).
20. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS?
(2001).

21. See, e.g., Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered
Deliberationin Chicago Schools and Policing,29 POL. & SOc'Y 73 (2001).
22. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY
(2001).

23. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
24. See, e.g., Griinne de Bdirca, The ConstitutionalChallenge of New Governance in the European Union, 28 EUR. L. REV. 814 (2003); Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly.Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional
Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET
289 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002); Hritier, supra note 7,
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New Governance methods within European Union member
25
states is also noted.
Despite a profusion of literature and the ambitious claims
of its authors, however, these developments-both the collective body of New Governance scholarship and the underlying
social and political developments upon which that scholarship
is predicated-have been widely underappreciated in the legal
academic literature at large. There may be several reasons for
this.
First, by all accounts the actual transition of New Governance approaches to public problem solving thus far has been
26
spotty.

Innovations occur here and there, discernible within a

number of disparate policy domains but dominant in few, and
the outcomes of these scattered policy experiments remain ambiguous and contested. 27 Even the most successful experiments
have yet to be replicated widely, leaving them vulnerable to the
at 185-204; Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New
Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002);

Trubek & Mosher, supra note 2.
25. See, e.g., Christoph Demmke, Towards Effective Environmental Regulation: Innovative Approaches in Implementing and Enforcing European Envi-

ronmental Law and Policy, Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/01 (2001), available
at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010501.html (arguing that
"virtually no [EU] Member State can any longer be characterised as centralised," as important powers once held by national bureaucracies are increasingly decentralized or coordinated through non-hierarchical networks of decentralized actors).
26. See Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalismfor Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 360 (2003) (arguing that experimentalism "has
not yet gained the traction. .. that it ought to have"); Matt Wilson & Eric
Weltman, Government's Job, in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM, su-

pra note 14, at 49, 49 ("[C]itizens' engagement in environmental matters is the
exception, not the rule, and is often made necessary when government is not
doing its job."); DeWitt John, Good Cops, Bad Cops, in BEYOND BACKYARD

ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 61, 64 (endorsing New Governance innovations in environmental policy but characterizing such innovations as "still
marginal"); Theodore J. Lowi, Frontyard Propaganda,in BEYOND BACKYARD
ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 70, 72 ("[Flor every supporting case

study there is almost inevitably an unsupportive case study."); Daniel A. Farber, Triangulatingthe Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 67 ("[N]o one can be certain
whether these moves toward more regulatory flexibility are flukes or harbingers of the future of environmental law."); id. at 75 ("[W]hether today's reinvention efforts will evolve into genuine governance structures is purely speculative.").
27. See Tushnet, supra note 26, at 358-59 (arguing that the innovations
in public education claimed by Sabel and Liebman are only partially confirmed
by the evidence they present, indicating a "romantic tendency" toward "overclaiming").
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skeptics' charge that their success depends upon factors unique
28
Conto their own time, place, and fortuitous circumstances.
sequently, within any given field of inquiry, New Governance
approaches may appear to some to be aberrational, idiosyncratic, or unproven, and the anecdotes and case studies heralding these developments unconvincing, except to the choir of the
already converted.
Some fault may also lie in the narrow, subject-specific orientation of some New Governance scholars themselves, who
may neglect to link observed innovations in their own fields to
broader trends in patterns of social organization elsewhere, and
who may not always be attentive to where their own work fits
into the broader sweep of emerging New Governance scholarship. 29 Additionally, some New Governance scholars may be
more keenly attuned to the differences that separate their own
work from that of others working in the same genre than to the
commonalities that link them, even if at some level they recog-

28. See id. at 360 (noting that "[p]articular experimentalist programs get
traction because of their location in particular political circumstances," but
broader coordinating mechanisms and general political support are needed "if
experimentalist constitutionalism as a general approach is to take hold outside the Upper West Side"); Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 379, 428 (2000)
(concluding that "[c]ollaborative watershed institutions, like the Chesapeake
Bay Program, will be more difficult to establish in some settings than in others and, where transaction costs are high.. . may not be pursued at all").
29. To avoid pointing an accusatory finger at others, I cite as a prime example my own work, which is directed largely at New Governance in the field
of environmental regulation. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded
Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Adaptive
Ecosystem Management]; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem
Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 555; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursorto a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001) [hereinafter Karkkainen, TRI]; Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL.
POL. 72 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring
and Managing Government's EnvironmentalPerformance, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
903 (2002) [hereinafter Karkkainen, NEPA]; Charles Sabel, Archon Fung &
Bradley Karkkainen, Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND
BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 3. The author is by no
means unaware of the parallels to developments in other fields, but the body
of work cited above is addressed primarily to the community of environmental
law and policy scholars and only rarely references the broader New Governance literature.
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nize a distant kinship. 30 Some, perhaps, may be more interested in winning debating points on the fine-grained particulars than in persuading a broader audience of the merits of the
general approach. 31
Finally, in its sheer novelty, the recent profusion of New
Governance scholarship has not yet settled upon a common
nomenclature, leaving even the most dedicated reader with the
daunting task of sorting through and translating a bewildering
babel of unfamiliar, competing, and possibly incompatible terminology, which may or may not describe similar phenomena in
different terms, or different phenomena in similar terms. 32 In
this area of scholarship, as in many others, contestation over
naming rights appears to be half the battle, but as a byproduct
it tends to generate opacity and outright confusion.
Taken as a whole, however-and setting aside for the moment both the underlying merits of New Governance approaches to public problem solving and the important conceptual differences that separate competing intellectual camps
within this larger body of thought-the burgeoning New Governance literature surely represents a major trend, and arguably an important emerging intellectual movement in legal, public policy, and social science scholarship. It is high time that the
participants, as well as the broader intellectual community, acknowledged as much.
The signal accomplishment of Lobel's article is that it puts
us all on notice that something big is afoot here, at least in the
American legal academy, probably in social science scholarship
more generally, and possibly even in the world. The article
sounds a clear alarm, calling to our attention the commonalities and collective thrust of the New Governance scholarship
and loosely stitching together its various components within a
framework pitched at a sufficiently high level of generality to
be capable of holding together all its diverse parts. At that
level, the article serves as a useful general introduction to the
New Governance literature, more accessible to the general
reader than is much of the specialized literature itself.
The article's strengths are also its greatest weaknesses,
however. A high level of generality is useful up to a point. It
30.
notes.
31.

32.
ants).

Ensconced in his own glass house, the author declines to throw footSee supra note 29.

See Lobel, supra note 1, at 345-47 (listing some twenty-three vari-
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may allow us to discern patterns and linkages among phenomena we had not otherwise thought to connect. But it also has its

costs, especially if it leads us to lose sight of the richness, variety, and distinctive qualities of the individual components that
comprise the larger whole.
It is sometimes said that the two most basic intellectual
moves are "lumping" and "splitting"-that is, finding relevant
common characteristics that allow us intelligently and usefully
to group apparently distinct phenomena into a single category
("lumping"), 33 and finding relevant distinguishing characteristics that allow us intelligently and usefully to separate other-

wise similar phenomena into distinct classes ("splitting"). 34 The

best descriptive, interpretive, and analytical work, whether in
law, medicine, biology, history, or any of a hundred other disciplines, does a good deal of both-lumping seemingly disparate
phenomena into original categories that reveal unexpected patterns and lead to novel insights, while employing the chisel of
penetrating distinction to sunder conventional, shopworn categories that may conceal more than they reveal. Lobel's article is
uncommonly long on lumping, some of it useful, some less so.
Unfortunately, it is at times short on splitting.

33. See Eviatar Zerubavel, Lumping and Splitting: Notes on Social Classification, 11 SOC. F. 421, 422 (1996) (stating that in "lumping" things together,
"we allow their perceived similarity to outweigh any differences among them").
The lumping-splitting debate is important in such disparate fields as biology,
history, medicine, and law. See, e.g., J.H. HEXTER, ON HISTORIANS 242-43
(1979) (stating that among historians, "[i]nstead of noting differences, lumpers
note likenesses; instead of separateness, connection"); GEORGE GAYLORD
SIMPSON, PRINCIPLES OF ANIMAL TAXONOMY 137-40 (L.C. Dunn ed., 1961);
Craig A. Bunnell & Eric P. Winer, Lumping Versus Splitting: The Splitters
Take This Round, 20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3576, 3577 (2002) (noting that
"[flor several decades, there has been debate about whether breast cancer clinicians and researchers should lump or split" by treating all breast cancers as
manifestations of a single disease or as a cluster of heterogeneous diseases);
James A Gardner, Coherence or Bust: Telling Tales About Election Law, 36
CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) ("[L]umping and splitting are standard techniques in
the repertoire of lawyers."). At a more basic level, lumping and splitting are
said to be foundational cognitive operations. See Zerubavel, supra at 422 (stating that lumping and splitting "involve the diametrically opposite cognitive
acts of assimilation and differentiation" but they "are, in fact, complementary
since they are both necessary for carving islands of meaning out of reality").
34. See Zerubavel, supra note 33, at 424 ("Whereas lumping involves overlooking differences within mental clusters, splitting entails widening the perceived gaps between them, thereby reinforcing their mental separateness.");
HEXTER, supra note 33, at 242 (stating that among historians, splitters "like to
point out divergences, to perceive differences, to draw distinctions" and "do not
mind untidiness and accident in the past").
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Herewith, then, some splitting as antidote to Lobel's overzealous lumping.
Some participants in current debates over the New Governance will think Lobel's article arbitrarily conflates too many
distinct strands in the literature-especially insofar as it ignores unique aspects of their own work that set it apart from
the rest. Intellectual debates often rage fiercest at these close
quarters, in the natural competition that develops among those
working within a single genre. Here, fine distinctions may
make all the difference, determining whose account best accords with observed facts, has the greatest explanatory and
predictive power, is most elegant and economical, is most
clearly and powerfully expressed, and ultimately is best received in the larger intellectual community. It is, of course, beyond the scope of a broad literature canvass like Lobel's to recapitulate every detail of every debate, but her account scarcely
acknowledges any debate, difference, or diverging tendency
among New Governance scholars. A more complete and balanced treatment of this literature would recognize that there
are not only disagreements but often important incompatibilities among competing views, sometimes on questions of fundamental importance, within a family of scholars whose work is
nonetheless seen from a more distant perspective as broadly related.
Some participants in these debates may also object to what
they regard as oversimplified or anodyne treatments of their
work, which they may regard as potentially misleading. In
some cases, scholars may even think that by lumping them together with others in broad-brush characterizations of New
Governance scholarship as a whole, Lobel mischaracterizes
their work and attributes to them views which they do not in
fact hold.
All of this is to say that, much like the uniform one-sizefits-all rules that New Governance scholars criticize, Lobel's
highly general, one-size-fits-all statement of a New Governance
credo is probably not an accurate reflection of anyone's views,
save perhaps Lobel's own. A few examples will suffice. I draw
these primarily from my own field of expertise, environmental
law and policy, as well as from the "democratic experimentalist" strain within the broader New Governance literature where
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35
and
many of my closest collaborators situate themselves
lie.
commitments
intellectual
own
my
of
some
where

I. REFLEXIVE LAW vs. DEWEYAN EXPERIMENTALISM
Lobel relies heavily on the "autopoietic" and "reflexive law"
theories of the German legal theorist Gunther Teubner to establish the rationale for a shift from the conventional regula36
tory model to a New Governance approach. Lobel is, of course,
entitled to use all or part of Teubner's work as a foundation for
her own views. But here, as at other crucial points in the article, there is ambiguity as to whether Lobel is merely stating
her own views, or instead purporting to characterize the views
that define New Governance scholarship as a whole. To the extent the article appears to imply a consensus among New Governance scholars with respect to the role of Teubner's theories
of autopoiesis and reflexivity in providing the theoretical underpinnings for their work, it is misleading.
Teubner is, to be sure, an important, original, and influential thinker, and some New Governance scholars have invoked
his work to provide theoretical grounding for their own intellectual constructs. 3 7 However, most New Governance scholars do
not subscribe to Teubner's theories, relatively few base their
own work on it, and some find his thinking incompatible with
38
their own.
Teubner himself emphasizes the "radical constructivism" of
his view, stating that "the theory of law as an autopoietic system stresses law's autonomy, its normative closure, structural
35. Principals in the POPPS collaborative research effort-Mike Dorf, Archon Fung, Chuck Sabel, Bill Simon, Dara O'Rourke, and myself-include
many of the chief expositors of "democratic experimentalism."
36. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 361-65, 405-06 tbl.2.
37. See, e.g., Orts, supra note 14, at 1254-55 (attributing the idea of "reflexive law" to 'legal theorists working in the Weberian tradition of social theory, most notably Gunther Teubner"); Eric W. Orts, Autopoiesis and the Natural Environment, in LAW'S NEW BOUNDARIES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL

AUTOPOIESIS 159 (Jili Pfibdfi & David Nelken eds., 2001) [hereinafter Orts,
Autopoiesis]; Sanford E. Gaines, Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigmfor Sustainable Development, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2002).
38. See Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 384, 398-99 (2003) (reviewing JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A
NEW LEGAL PARADIGM (2002)) (rejecting Teubner's theory of autopoiesis but
claiming that democratic experimentalism represents a distinctively nonTeubnerian variant on the principle of reflexivity); Orts, Autopoiesis, supra
note 37, at 159 (acknowledging that in the United States, adoption of the
autopoietic theory of law "has been halting').
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determination, dynamic stability, emerging eigenvalues in binary codes and normative programs, and its reflexive identity."39 In this closed, autonomous, self-contained, and selfregulating system, Teubner argues, law consists of an endless,
self-reproducing "chain of operations," a "self-referential circularity where validity becomes a circular relation between rule
making and rule application."40
On Teubner's (and derivatively, Lobel's) account, the crisis
of substantive regulatory law emerges from mismatches that
arise when law attempts to colonize and control other, similarly
self-referential, self-reproducing social subsystems. Regulatory
law turns out to be either undereffective because it makes insufficient alterations in the internal dynamics of the subsystems it seeks to regulate, or too intrusive and therefore destructive of the internal dynamics of the regulated subsystems,
or distorted insofar as it suffers from a kind of reverse colonization or "capture" by the very fields it seeks to regulate.41 The
solution, according to Teubner (again via Lobel), is to adopt "reflexive" legal strategies that aim to influence a restructuring of
the internal dynamics of the regulated subsystems so as to
achieve the stated regulatory objective through dynamic selfregulation within the internal, self-reproducing operations of
the regulated sphere.42
39. Gunther Teubner, The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of

Law's Hierarchy,31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 763, 764 (1997).

40. Id. at 764-65.
41. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 363-64; Gunther Teubner, Substantive and
Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 239, 274 (1983)
[hereinafter Teubner, Reflexive Elements] (noting that "[s]ubstantive legal rationality ... attempts to regulate social structures by legal norms... follow[ing] criteria of rationality and patterns of organization which are poorly
suited to the internal social structure of the regulated spheres," with the result that "law as a medium of the welfare state either turns out to be ineffective or it works effectively but at the price of destroying" the very social
spheres it seeks to regulate); Gunther Teubner. Juridification- Concepts,
Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND
SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 3, 21 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) [hereinafter Teubner, Juridification](stating the "regulatory trilemma" in which every regulatory intervention based upon "the notion that law or politics could have a direct goal oriented controlling influence on sectors of society" is "either
irrelevant or produces disintegrating effects on the social area of life or else
disintegrating effects on regulatory law itself").
42. See Teubner, Reflexive Elements, supra note 41, at 274 (stating that a
"reflexive orientation.., seeks to identify opportunity structures that allow
legal regulation to cope with social problems without, at the same time, irreversibly destroying valued patterns of social life," leading to "the policy of pro-
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The theory is an intriguing one, and it has led some New
Governance scholars to call for "reflexive law" solutions akin to
those Teubner advocates. However, New Governance scholarship also embraces many strands beyond Teubnerian autopoiesis and reflexivity. Indeed, many of the developments and
proposals that Lobel reports elsewhere in her article cannot be
and arguably are incompatible with, Teubnerian rereduced to,
43
flexivity.
Many, and probably most, New Governance scholars have
simply found it unnecessary to embrace Teubner's controversial
and far-reaching theories. For some, the empirical observation
that conventional regulatory mechanisms either are not working or are approaching the limits of their effectiveness is
enough to justify, on purely instrumental grounds, the turn to a
more open and collaborative style of decision making, which is
adthought to bring with it certain epistemic and legitimacy
44
approaches.
bureaucratic
vantages over conventional
ceduralization under which the legal system concerns itself with providing the
structural premises for self-regulation within other social subsystems"); Orts,
supra note 14, at 1232 ("[R]eflexive environmental law aims to establish selfreflective processes within businesses to encourage creative, critical, and continual thinking about how to minimize environmental harms.").
43. See Farber, supra note 26, at 61-62 (identifying three distinct models
of environmental "reinvention": a reflexive "self-regulation" model, a multilateral and collaborative "governance" model, and a bilateral and quasicontractual "bargaining" model); Fiorino, supra note 14, at 466 (distinguishing
Teubner's reflexive law approach from an equally robust New Governance literature on "social-political governance" and a third strand based on a "policylearning perspective," and concluding that the latter "offers the most comprehensive explanation of and prescription for policy change"); Orts, Autopoiesis,
supra note 37, at 174-75 (distinguishing "reflexive law" from "informational
regulation" and "environmental contracts" as distinct categories of environmental law reform); Stewart, supra note 9, at 448-50 (distinguishing "reflexive law" approaches in which "government develops frameworks and communication channels to promote self-regulating measures by nongovernmental
entities" from more direct collaboration through "flexible agency-stakeholder
networks for innovative regulatory problem-solving" in which "federal agencies are active, often dominant partners in the process, and the result is a
quasi-contractual working relationship among the participants to solve regulatory problems on a coordinated basis"). For his part, Teubner at times seems
prepared to embrace a wide array of New Governance innovations as forms of
"indirect regulation" that attempt to avoid the problems associated with "juridification." See Teubner, Juridification,supra note 41, at 33-38 (characterizing RegNeg, regulatory contracting, quasi-regulatory "[b]argaining in the
shadow of law," and various forms of proceduralization as forms of "indirect
regulation[]" arising in response to the juridification problem).
44. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation
and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 63 (2000) (arguing that
regulatory negotiation is "a superior process for generating information, facili-
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Others, grounding their own work in philosophical pragmatism-what John Dewey himself labeled "experimentalism"45-are

even more deeply skeptical of Teubner's systems

theory-based approach, which both implies and demands a hyper-rationalist capacity to map and reengineer the internal dynamics of complex social systems so as to achieve the selfregulating reflexivity that Teubner recommends. Writings of
the "democratic experimentalist" camp, in particular, emphasize the inherent and inescapable epistemic constraints that
limit our ability to map and devise comprehensive solutions to
complex and dynamic social problems, militating in favor of a
regulatory architecture that embraces the provisionality, revisability, and experimental character of all policy determinations. 46 From the democratic experimentalist perspective, it is
both not enough and too much to attempt to address complex
problems by reengineering institutions so as to set up Teubnerian self-regulating reflexive law solutions. It is "not enough"
because ongoing interventions and policy adjustments will always be necessary in light of experience and new learning47 It
is "too much" because the quest to use law to engineer perfectly
self-regulating, self-equilibrating reflexivity within otherwise
autonomous spheres of activity is itself an impossibly ambitious
undertaking given background epistemic constraints. 48
tating learning, and building trust," and that it "increases legitimacy, defined
as the acceptability of the regulation to those involved in its development");
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) (arguing that "the goals of efficacy and legitimacy
are better served by a model that views the administrative process as a problem-solving exercise in which parties share responsibility for all stages of the
rule-making process, in which solutions are provisional, and in which the state
plays an active, if varied, role").
45. See Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal
Protection, 22 YALE L. & POLY REV. 261, 287-89 (2004) (outlining Dewey's
"experimental" method of addressing social problems, in
which "policies and
proposals for social action [are] treated as working hypotheses" that must be
"subject to ready and flexible revision in the light
of observed consequences"
(quoting JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 202-03 (1927))).

46. See Sabel et al., supra note 14, at 9, 13-14 (stating that democratic
experimentalism "discounts the possibility of central, panoramic knowledge"
and contrasting this with conventional regulation's "claim to a modest omniscience").
47. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 315 ("A central lesson of the limitations of New Deal institutions is that effective government services and
regulations must be continuously adapted and recombined to respond to diverse and changing local conditions .... ").
48. See id. at 284-85 (grounding democratic experimentalism in a pragmatist approach to "problem solving in a world.., that is bereft of first princi-
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What is required instead, democratic experimentalists argue, is a centrally coordinated and monitored system of parallel
local experiments, networked and disciplined through structured information disclosures and monitoring requirements,
subject to rolling minimum performance benchmarks but otherwise free to experiment in a continuous and ceaseless effort
49
to improve, learn, and revise. Such a regulatory architecture,
aimed at structuring ongoing social and institutional learning
while acknowledging the inescapable fallibility and revisability
of what is learned, contemplates neither the degree of selfregulating autonomy nor the self-equilibrating reflexivity of
Teubnerian systems. Democratic experimentalism thus represents a distinctly pragmatist, non-Teubnerian take on both the
theoretical foundations for New Governance, and on the instrumentalities and institutional mechanisms appropriate to
its successful implementation.
II. "SOFTNESS" IN LAW
Lobel also makes much of "softness" in New Governance
50
approaches, which she equates variously with flexibility, non52
requireless rigid procedural
coerciveness, 51 informalism,
54
53 and nonenforcement or nonenforceability.
ments,
Here, Lobel is careful to acknowledge that New Governance scholarship embraces a range of (possibly incompatible)
views as to what kind and degree of "softness" in law is appro-

ples and beset by unintended consequences," in which "experience will again
and again disrupt our habits and the understandings that rest on them"); id.
at 285 n.59 (contrasting this non-equilibrium approach with other views that
"portray behavior and institutions as conducive to or resulting from some selfreinforcing pattern or equilibrium").
49. See id. at 345-46 (describing a democratic experimentalist regulatory
architecture in which administrative agencies form "the continuing organized
link between the national and the local, helping to create through national action the local conditions for experimentation" and ensuring transparency, accountability, and discipline through "benchmarking comparisons and regulation through benchmarking"); Sabel et al., supra note 14, at 6-7, 13-15
(describing a "rolling-rule regime" in which local units are free to experiment
within broad limits, subject to rolling minimum performance benchmarks and
detailed monitoring and reporting requirements).
50. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 388-89.
51. See id. at 388.
52. See id. at 388-89.
53. See id. at 390-91.
54. See id. at 392-93.
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priate, and why. 55 Yet Lobel does not pause long enough to articulate any particular view as to what kind and degree of
"softness" is needed, much less to contrast
competing positions
in the debate. Instead, the reader is presented with a long
menu of "soft" legal forms, coupled with an undifferentiated array of arguments drawn from disparate sources as to when and
why one or more of those "soft" forms are appropriate. This confusing stew may lend the false impression that New Governance scholars are collectively desperate to latch onto some, perhaps any form of "softness," without being able to articulate a
coherent rationale for doing so or to agree upon what form such
"softness" should take.
This impression is unfortunately reinforced and exacerbated by Lobel's Table 2, summarizing the key differences between the "New Governance Model" and the "Traditional Regulatory Model."56 There, Lobel summarily characterizes the
"power of law" under the New Governance
Model as "'[s]oft,'
[a]spirational, [g]uidance, [v]oluntary, [and] [s]tructured but
unsanctioned," and contrasts this with the Traditional Regulatory Model, where law is understood to be "'[h]ard,' [c]oercive,
[r]ules, [m]andatory, [and] [s]anctioned."57
I would be hard pressed to identify any New Governance
scholar who advocates such across-the-board "softness" in all
aspects of law as appears in Lobel's Table 2. If any are out
there, their work surely lies at the outer margins of New Governance scholarship.
It would be less misleading, perhaps, to say that most New
Governance scholars acknowledge the necessity for some or
many forms of "hardness" in law, and would deviate from that,
if at all, only by admitting "softness" in one or a few aspects of
the legal regime they envision. At one extreme, for example,
are advocates of negotiated rulemaking (RegNeg) and other
contractarian approaches, categories Lobel herself includes in
the universe of recognized forms of New Governance.58 On
standard accounts, negotiated rulemaking and environmental
contracting are not about "softness" at all. Instead, they are al55. See id. at 388 ("There is a wide spectrum of what softer processes
increased flexibility might mean for law reform."); id. at 393 ("As with and
other
principles of the governance model, different rationales abound as to why,
in

certain contexts, soft mechanisms may be preferable to hard regulation.").

56. See id. at 405-06 tbl.2.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 377-78.
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ternative, consensual or consent-based procedures for arriving
at conventionally "hard"-that is, fixed, definite, formal, ulti59
mately coercive, enforceable and enforced-regulatory rules.
Nor are these alternative rulemaking procedures understood to
be less formal than conventional top-down administrative
rulemaking processes. Indeed, many advocates of RegNeg and
environmental contracting are sticklers for procedural specificity and regularity, out of concerns that in the absence of such
parties
procedural safeguards either regulators or regulated
60
might be tempted to "game" the negotiating process.
Other New Governance scholars would admit only a bit
more "softness" here and there. Eric Orts, for example, in discussing environmental impact assessment as a form of "reflexive" environmental law, freely acknowledges the necessity of
mandatory procedural rules, backed by coercive sanctions for
noncompliance, to generate the desired self-regulatory reflexivity.6 1 Nor is my own work on mandatory information disclosure

as an alternative form of environmental regulation 62 wholly reliant upon voluntarism or unsanctioned, aspirational norms.
Instead, it envisions mandatory rules, ultimately backed by coercive sanctions, to compel detailed disclosures of specified
kinds of information. The information thus revealed is expected
not only to result in a better informed, better calibrated con59. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33-36 (2000)
(detailing procedures under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, in which negotiations that successfully reach a consensus proposal trigger a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and promulgation of a conventional, legally enforceable regulatory rule).
60. See, e.g., Derek Raymond McDonald, Judicial Review of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 12 REV. LITIG. 467 (1993) (generally endorsing negotiated rulemaking but arguing that concerns about agency accountability, interest group
participation, and adequate representation of the public interest militate in
favor of careful judicial review and institutional measures to ensure the participation of all affected interests on an equal basis).
61. See Orts, supra note 14, at 1268 (suggesting mandatory annual individual or household environmental impact reporting with the aim to "increase
the amount of self-reflection and social communication concerning serious environmental issues").
62. See Karkkainen, TRI, supra note 29, at 261 (arguing that the EPA's
mandatory Toxics Release Inventory disclosure scheme "both compels and enables facilities and firms to monitor their own environmental performance"
and enables "internal and comparative benchmarking" that unleashes both
internal and external pressures for improvement) (emphasis omitted); Karkkainen, NEPA, supra note 29, at 971 (urging reforms in the environmental
impact assessment process to require additional post-decision monitoring and
adaptive mitigation measures).
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ventional regulatory process capable of singling out chronically
underperforming facilities, firms, and sectors for priority regulatory interventions, but also to unleash an array of informal
and indirect pressures for performance improvement, not least
among these the anticipatory fear that harsher (formal, mandatory) regulation may be forthcoming if the underperformers
do not undertake improvements on their own initiative. There
is, to be sure, some element of "softness" in both Orts's vision of
reflexive environmental law and my work on information-based
environmental regulation, insofar as both ultimately rely on
self-initiated improvements in environmental performance undertaken within an incentive system created by a mandatory
legal framework. But that element of "softness" is carefully cabined and operates only in concert with harder legal rules that
set the overall context.
Other variants on New Governance would employ different
mixes of "hard" and "soft" legal rules. Michael Dorf and Charles
Sabel's version of democratic experimentalism, for example,
contemplates mandatory participation in local problem-solving
experiments under the discipline of mandatory (but rolling)
minimum performance standards set and periodically revised
by a central coordinating body, 63 coupled with a reserved coercive power on the part of the center to intervene for purposes of
forcing reconsideration and reconfiguration of local experiments gone seriously awry. 64 To characterize this complex and
subtle blend of interdependent "hard" and "soft" instruments as
merely "soft, aspirational, guidance, voluntary, and structured
but unsanctioned" is to do it a grave injustice. 65
One of the persistent and pervasive misconceptions about
New Governance is that it is wholly reliant on "soft law"
mechanisms, and therefore ultimately dependent on the good
63. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 350-52, 354-56 (stating that experimentalist regulation would engage in rulemaking through "learning-bymonitoring," setting "rolling best-practice rules," and linking "benchmarking,
rulemaking, and revision so closely with operating experience that rulemakers
and operating-world actors work literally side by side"); Sabel et al., supra
note 14, at 8 ("Central authorities ensure that local units live up to their commitments by coordinating their activities, monitoring their performance, pooling their experiences, and enforcing feasible standards that emerge from their
practice.").
64. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 349 (stating that "[t]ruculence
would be sanctioned initially by the administrative agency," but "aggrieved
citizen users" would have a "statutory right to participation" enforceable by
judicial review).
65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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intentions and voluntary actions of parties who heretofore have
shown little inclination toward acting in the desired directions.
On those grounds, it is easily dismissed by its misinformed critics as so much wishful thinking.66 A careful and sympathetic
reading of Lobel's article indicates that she does not share that
misconception. Unfortunately, given its incomplete and potentially misleading discussion of the role of "soft law" in New
Governance, the article does less than it might to dispel that
myth, and inadvertently may reinforce it.
III. CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM VS. OTHER SHADES OF
NEW ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
Lobel lumps together all New Governance scholarship in
law and policy under the rubric of
the area of environmental
"civic environmentalism" 6 7-a satisfactory term, perhaps, had
that brand name not already been appropriated by a few scholars whose work is unrepresentative of the field as a whole.
Lobel is not the first to make this mistake. One of the most
vitriolic critics of New Environmental Governance, Rena Steinzor, has repeatedly done so in a series of articles attacking
these approaches, 68 although one suspects that Steinzor's
broad-brush lumping may be an element in a calculated rhetorical strategy that permits her to attack New Governance
generally by singling out some of its most vulnerable variants.
This, then, is an opportunity to set that record straight.
In plain fact, not all New Governance scholars in this field
subscribe to the tenets of "civic environmentalism" as advanced

66. See, e.g., Jacqueline Savitz, Compensating Citizens, in BEYOND
BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 65, 65 (dismissing some

New Governance proposals as "more a wishful fantasy than a true analysis of
any reorientation in environmental regulation," involving "portray[ing] a
world in which win-win situations abound, limited only by our willingness to
build partnerships and work together through a participatory dialogue").
67. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 424 ("Increasingly, scholars advocate a new
approach to environmentalism known as-civic environmentalism.").
68. See Rena I. Steinzor, Myths of the Reinvented State, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
223, 233-35 (2001) (posing the fundamental question in environmental policy
as a stark choice between top-down, command-style regulation and "civic environmentalism," a "bottom up" approach based on voluntarism, good intentions,
and wishful thinking); Rena I. Steinzor, The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,909 (2000) (lumping together all New Governance proposals under the rubric of "civic environmentalism" and attacking the
latter on grounds that its terms are subject to manipulation by opponents of
environmental protection).

490

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:471

by the leading proponents of that term, DeWitt John69 and William Shutkin. 70 Nor has the term "civic environmentalism" itself gained widespread currency, except perhaps among its critics.
It is not even clear that John and Shutkin themselves
mean the same thing by "civic environmentalism."71 John's
variant emphasizes above all devolution of environmental policymaking and policy implementation to state and local levels of
decision making (whether in governmental, private, or hybrid
public-private institutional settings), 72 coupled with high levels
of citizen participation 73 and a general preference for voluntary
solutions over regulatory interventions. 74 John's "civic environmentalism" thus can be seen to rest on three distinct but
overlapping policy presumptions: a subsidiarity principle urging that decisions be made at the most localized level appropriate to the problem, a general presumption in favor of participation by as many parties as have an interest in the matter at
hand, and a presumption in favor of voluntary action over coercion whenever and to whatever extent the voluntary approach
is capable of contributing to meaningful solutions to the problem at hand.
Shutkin's version of "civic environmentalism" arises in a
rather different context. Shutkin focuses on the need for inter69. See
generally DEWITT
JOHN,
Civic
ENVIRONMENTALISM:
ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES (1994); John,
supra note 26.
70. See generally WILLIAM A. SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE:
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2000)
[hereinafter SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE]; William A. Shutkin, Realizing the Promise of the New Environmental Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 691

(1999) [hereinafter Shutkin, Realizing the Promise].
71.

See SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE, supra note 70, at 15-16

(distinguishing his own conception of "civic environmentalism" from John's on
grounds that the latter "focuses mainly on the role of states and municipalities" and is "more technical," while Shutkin "put[s] more stock in the overall
efficacy of and need for certain traditional regulatory schemes").
72. See JOHN, supra note 69, at 7 ("The central idea animating civic environmentalism is that in some cases, communities and states will organize on
their own to protect the environment, without being forced to do so by the federal government.").
73. See id. at 10 (stating that civic environmentalism is characterized by
"bargaining among a diverse set of participants" and a "collaborative" approach).
74. See id. at 9-10 (stating that in contrast to command-and-control regulation, "civic environmentalism uses a variety of tools, such as technical assistance to farmers and small businesses, subsidies, public education, and new
approaches to investing in public services and facilities").
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governmental, intersectoral, and public-private collaboration in
long-term regional "eco-development" planning. Planning efforts would be centered in new coordinating and networking institutions that "by design, can link and coordinate the various
existing stakeholders across each sector, while adding value
through disseminating and deploying knowledge and information about best practices, storehousing lessons, ideas, and networks, facilitating local planning and community75development
strategies, and enacting public values and vision."
These regional planning efforts, in Shutkin's view, should
be broadly participatory, "empowering a diverse set of stakeholders to work to improve and protect our natural resources
...while building social capital.., and promoting sustainable
economic development." 76 Thus Shutkin's civic environmentalism "embraces the Western tradition of civic humanism or civic
bonum of society
republicanism, which holds that the summum
77
is the full participation of equal citizens."
Both John and Shutkin, then, would devolve a significant
share of environmental policy responsibility to more localized
levels, in fora that allow for and encourage citizen engagement
in the policy process. Both would deemphasize nationally uniform, narrowly subject-specific (and therefore collectively fragmentary) rules. Both advance process-oriented solutions.
There the similarity ends. John's vision conjoins conven78
tional notions of federalism and subsidiarity with an unvarnished faith in the good will of citizens and the power of voluntary action to solve certain kinds of environmental problemsalbeit backstopped by coercive rules and national-level policies
where necessary and appropriate.7 9 Shutkin's vision, on the
other hand, is in part the rational planner's utopia, in which
comprehensive land use planning, economic development planning, and natural resources management are joined at the hip,
carried out at regional scales, and subordinated to, or at least
75. Shutkin, Realizing the Promise,supra note 70, at 702.
76. SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE, supra note 70, at 14-15.
77. Id. at 28.
78. See JOHN, supra note 69, at 271-82 (arguing that states hold a "comparative advantage" over the federal government in addressing some kinds of
environmental problems and in using some kinds of non-regulatory policy

tools).
79. See id. at 14-16 ("Civic environmentalism is not a replacement for
traditional regulatory policies; it is rather a complement to those policies."); id.
at 297 ("[T]he federal government must support bottom-up initiatives by maintaining a strong regime of top-down regulation.").
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significantly constrained by, ecological considerations. But it
also embraces a civic republican commitment to full citizen participation in the planning process, valued as much for its democracy-enhancing character as for its problem-solving ability.80 The product of such regional comprehensive planning
efforts undoubtedly would include the usual output of land use
and economic development planning: some mixture of mandatory use restrictions, conditions on development approvals, and
financial incentives, albeit aligned in more coherent, coordinated, and ecologically sensitive patterns than we now see. 8 '
Arguments can be made on behalf of either John's or Shutkin's version of "civic environmentalism," but it is probably a
mistake to conflate them. It is even more problematic to conflate either variant with the wide range of New Governance
approaches that Lobel lumps together under the general label
of "civic environmentalism."2 It is doubtful, for example, that
Eric Orts's vision of "reflexive environmental law," which expressly draws its inspiration from Teubner, can be fairly regarded as an expression of either John's or Shutkin's version of
"civic environmentalism."s3 Ditto for efforts to nudge regulatory
enforcement programs in the direction of emphasizing voluntary corporate compliance with fixed, conventional, federal
regulatory rules-a laudable idea perhaps, but one that appears to embrace neither Teubner-inspired reflexive selfregulation, nor the locally oriented, John- or Shutkin-inspired
variants of "civic environmentalism."8 4
That brings us, finally, to Habitat Conservation Plans
(HCPs) under the Endangered Species Act, a program whose
meaning and potential are deeply contested both within New
80. See SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE, supra note 70, at 14 (defining "civic environmentalism" as "the idea that members (stakeholders) of a
particular geographic and political community-residents, businesses, government agencies, and nonprofits-should engage in planning and organizing
activities to ensure a future that is environmentally healthy and economically
and socially vibrant at the local and regional levels"); id. at 15-16 ("[M]y conception of civic environmentalism moves beyond the confines of environmental
policy and administration to the arena of civic life in the broad sense.").
81. See id. at 15 ("I put more stock in the overall efficacy of and need for
certain traditional regulatory schemes than [John] does ....
82. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 424-32.
83. See id. at 425-26 (stating that "[e]nvironmental law scholars suggest
that policy should engender a practice of environmentally responsible reflexive
management," and citing Orts's work and the NEPA as examples).
84. See id. at 425-28 (citing literature on "cooperative implementation"
and voluntary compliance with federal environmental regulations).

20041

NEW GOVERNANCE

493

Governance scholarship and in the broader policy literature.
HCPs allow for partial waivers of the federal Endangered Species Act's otherwise rigid prohibition on the "taking" of (i.e.,
harm to) listed fish and wildlife species upon regulatory approval of a HCP designed to "minimize and mitigate" harm to
the harm falls within statutorily
the listed species, provided
85
specified parameters.
To some enthusiasts, this represents a sensible procedural
vehicle for achieving a workable compromise between private
property rights, economic development needs, and the aspirational but sometimes economically unrealistic goals of endan86
gered species protection in concrete, particularized settings.
To some environmentalist critics, HCPs represent the worst
tendency to sacrifice environmental standards at the altar of
crass economic self-interest, and thus invite erosion of the animating principles of the Endangered Species Act, the most determinedly and single-mindedly eco-centric of all federal environmental

laws.8 7 To some property rights critics, HCPs

represent a form of government-sponsored extortion, a means
by which government exacts diffuse and uncompensated public
benefits from private landowners through coerced bargaining
88
under the threat of even harsher regulatory consequences.
85. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Donald J. Barry, Opportunity in the Face of Danger: The
PragmaticDevelopment of Habitat Conservation Plans, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POLY 129, 129 (1998) (describing HCPs as "probably the most
important development for endangered species conservation since the passage
of the original [Endangered Species] act"); id. at 131 (characterizing HCPs as a
strategy "to try and reconcile endangered species conservation with economic
development"); Timothy Beatley, Habitat Conservation Plans: A New Tool to
Resolve Land Use Conflicts, 7 LAND LINES (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
Cambridge, M.A.), Sept. 1995, available at http://www.lincolninst.edulpubs/
pub-detail.asp?id=539 (describing HCPs as a "mechanism to balance development and conservation" that has resulted in "considerable progress in habitat
conservation").
87. See John Kostyack, Reshaping Habitat ConservationPlans for Species
Recovery: An Introduction to a Series of Articles on Habitat Conservation
Plans, 27 ENVTL. L. 755, 757 (1997) (noting that "[s]ome in the environmental
movement have castigated the very concept of the HCP as an unwarranted
concession to developers and resource extraction interests, a concession that
they claim is by definition harmful to imperiled species"). Kostyack himself
takes a more nuanced view, arguing that HCPs should be reformed, not abandoned, and if reformed could play a positive role in conservation. See id. (arguing that if properly structured, "HCPs potentially can bring about conservation gains that could never be achieved by sole reliance upon the prohibitions
of the Endangered Species Act").
88. See, e.g., Press Release, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Sugg De-
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To one group of New Governance scholars, HCPs are a
straightforward example of environmental contracting, a mutually beneficial agreement between regulator and regulated in
which each is able to advance her position through a voluntary,
reciprocal exchange of valuable promises.8 9
To Chuck Sabel, Archon Fung, and myself writing a few
years ago, on the other hand, HCPs represented a tantalizing
but painfully incomplete expression of the potential to reconstruct U.S. environmental policy along pragmatic, democratic
experimentalist lines. 90 The HCP program suggested the possibility of a nationwide network of local experiments in integrated regional ecosystem management. Each HCP would be
tailored to local conditions but also subject to extensive monitoring and reporting requirements, and would operate under
"adaptive management" principles. Those principles would
demand periodic adjustments in management measures as conditions changed, as monitoring and science produced new understandings of what conservation measures were possible and
needed, and as innovative management interventions were
field-tested in practical application. In the full democratic experimentalist variant, we posited, a central coordinating
body-the Fish and Wildlife Service or its successor-would be
the repository of monitoring data and lessons learned from this
network of local experiments, providing the information base
for horizontal diffusion of best practices and rolling improvements in both institutional design and management techniques.

nounces Disinformation on ESA Reform (Mar. 4, 1998), available at http://
www.cei.org/gencon/003,02730.cfm (denouncing HCPs as "vast centralized zoning schemes that operate as legalized extortion rackets" and "force landowners
to pay the government for permission to use their own land").
89. See Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155,
194-95 (2000) (placing HCPs among a family of "contractual" approaches to
environmental regulation); Jason Scott Johnston, The Law and Economics of
Environmental Contracts, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE
APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND

EUROPE 271, 273-75 (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) (listing
HCPs as one of three important types of environmental contracts); Stewart,
supra note 11, at 73-75 (listing HCPs among a series of contractarian reforms
of environmental law).
90. See Sabel et al., supra note 14, at 30-36 (arguing that HCPs can "illuminate the promise of the new regulatory regime," but criticizing the overall
program for lack of effective information pooling and inconsistent commitments to monitoring and broad multi-party participation).
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Unfortunately, the reality fell far short of that aspiration.
Most HCPs, it turned out, were simple, single-parcel, singlespecies deals, not bold experiments in integrated regional ecosystem management. 9 1 Most included trifling, if any, monitoring and reporting requirements. 92 Few incorporated principles
of "adaptive management," 93 and even those that did relied
upon a very narrow, constrained understanding of what "adaptive management" implied. 94 Perhaps most troubling of all,
there was no systematic effort at central coordination, monitoring, information-pooling, and institutional learning. Instead,
responsibility for negotiating HCPs and enforcing their terms
was a responsibility assigned to regional and field offices, each
operating largely by its own lights. In short, there was no center, no functioning network of the parts, little monitoring and
consequently little transparency or accountability, and no
mechanism for information pooling, distillation of lessons
learned, diffusion of best practices, or system-wide institutional
learning. A small handful of HCPs did, however, more ambitiously attempt regional, multispecies, multilandowner solutions, and embraced principles of adaptive management to a
limited extent.
Are HCPs an example of "civic environmentalism," of either the John or Shutkin variety? Very probably not. Considered as a whole, they do not appear to incorporate any of John's
three presumptions: they rely principally on federal rather
than state or local implementation and enforcement, in most
cases (but with a few outliers) they are not broadly participatory, and they are not particularly voluntary, insofar as they
depend upon a kind of forced cooperation under threat of enforcement of a harsh regulatory rule if negotiation fails. As for
Shutkin's variant, arguably a few of the most ambitious re91. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 208, 210-13 (Archon Fund & Erik
Olin Wright eds., 2003) (distinguishing small bilateral HCPs from larger
multi-party HCPs and acknowledging that the former are far more numerous).
92. Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning, in DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY:

INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY

GOVERNANCE, supra note 91, at 144, 153-56.
93. See id. at 154 ("[R]elatively few HCPs have been conceived in terms of
adaptive management.... )
94. See Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management, supra note 29, at
953-54 (contrasting the narrowly constrained version of adaptive management used in HCPs with more robust variants advanced by ecologists and others).
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gional HCPs, especially those in southern California, come
fairly close to his vision of integrated, regional-scale ecological
and economic planning, but the program as a whole cannot be
so characterized.
Setting aside the "civic environmentalism" label, are HCPs
nonetheless a leading example of New Governance, as Lobel asserts? The answer, I submit, will depend upon what you count
as New Governance. For those content to settle for bipolar environmental contracting as an attractive species of New Governance, HCPs may look rather appealing. For those committed
to reflexive law solutions-Teubner, perhaps Orts, and possibly
Lobel herself in her reflexive law moments-HCPs appear to
miss the mark, as few incorporate principles of dynamic, reflexive self-regulation. For democratic experimentalists, HCPs-at
least in the overall thrust of the program-must be rated a
rather large disappointment, a promising possibility that falls
well short of the mark in implementation.
CONCLUSION
In the end, my point is just this: New Governance is not a
single model, but a loosely related family of alternative approaches to governance, each advanced as a corrective to the
perceived pathologies of conventional forms of regulation. New
Governance scholarship encompasses not just a single idea or
school of thought, but many competing, sometimes incompatible schools, related perhaps in their broadest outlines, but
nonetheless distinguishable along major fault lines that are
largely masked in Lobel's account. Some versions are highly
theoretical, others less so; some are derived largely from empirical observation, others more abstract and speculative. New
Governance scholarship spans conventional disciplinary and
subject-matter divisions, and embraces a variety of competing
methodologies. It is a broad field, filled with intellectual ferment and contestation. It is, by my lights at least, an exciting
and fertile field of inquiry, where much important work remains to be done.
Lobel's article does a more than creditable job of identifying some of the major strands of this emerging scholarship, and
pointing to commonalities, convergences, and points of contact
that entitle her to treat it as an interrelated whole. In this she
does us all a service, and advances an important contribution to
the literature. Unfortunately, at points the richness and vigor
of the internal debates, and the clarity of the main lines of di-
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vergence that separate some important strands of this scholarship from others, are obscured in Lobel's account, which for
short of the
that reason must be regarded as several steps
"comprehensive roadmap" the author promises. 95
None of this is intended, however, to detract from the very
important positive contribution that Lobel makes in calling this
scholarship to the attention of the larger legal academy, and in
providing a highly readable general introduction to this vast,
complex, rapidly growing, and exciting literature.

95. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 348 (promising "a comprehensive roadmap
of the dimensions and organizing principles of the governance model").

